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HOW THE SEC CAN HELP MITIGATE
THE "PROACTIVE" AGENCY COSTS OF
AGENCY CAPITALISM
BERNARD

S.

SHARFMAN*

To combat the "proactive" agency costs of agency capitalism, this
Article proposes that the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), in whatever form it deems
appropriate,requires mutualfund advisers to disclose, under the Proxy
Voting Rule, theirpolicies and procedures to: Avoid the opportunistic
use of their voting power at public companies as a means to obtain new
businessfrom activists such as publicpensionfundsand investmentfunds
associatedwith labor unions; Eliminatepressures to support the activism
of its own shareholdersat its portfolio companies; and Identify an actual
link between supportfor a shareholderproposal under Rule 14a-8 and
the enhancement ofshareholdervalue before voting in favor ofany such
proposal.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Investment advisers to mutual funds ("mutual fund advisers"), exchanged
traded funds, and separately managed accounts are typically delegated the
authority to vote their clients securities, including the voting rights
associated with a public company's common stock. Therefore, it should not
be surprising that the SEC, in its Release establishing the Proxy Voting Rule
("Release"),' took the position that an investment adviser2 "is a fiduciary that
owes each of its clients duties of care and loyalty with respect to all services
undertaken on the client's behalf, including proxy voting." 3 This was the
rationale behind the Proxy Voting Rule requiring investment advisers,
including mutual fund advisers, to create and disclose their proxy voting
policies and procedures. 4
However, the SEC and its staff have yet to clarify what these fiduciary
duties mean for the largest mutual fund advisers, such as BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors ("the Big Three"), now that they
control an extraordinary amount of shareholder voting power at many of our
largest public companies.' This phenomenon did not exist at the time the
Proxy Voting Rule was implemented.6
Moreover, this concentration of voting power is expected to increase over
time. In a recently posted article by John Coates, Professor Coates predicted
that in the near future the majority of voting shares of United States ("U.S.")
1. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA2106, 79 SEC Docket 1673 (Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Proxy Voting by Investment
Advisers], https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm.
2. 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(l 1) (2018) (defining investment advisor).
3. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 1.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2018) (stating that the Proxy Voting Rule was
promulgated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-6(4)).
5. See Carmel Shenkar, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Jan Fichtner, The New Mandate
Owners: Passive Asset Managers and the Decoupling of Corporate Ownership, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRON., June 2017, at 1, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/w
p-content/uploads/2017/06/CPI-Shenkar-Heemskerk-Fichtner.pdf;
see
also
Jan
Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bemardo, Hidden Power of the Big
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New
FinancialRisk, 19 Bus. & POL. 298, 299 (2017) (discussing the recent shift from active
to passive investment strategies in the United States, dominated by what the authors call
"the Big Three" - BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street - and their effect on
shareholder power).
6. Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bemardo, supra note 5.
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public companies will be held by only twelve mutual fund advisers.'
This concentration of voting power creates significant value for a mutual
fund adviser if it can be traded for something that the adviser wants in return.
For example, an adviser may use its voting power to support the activism of
current and potential institutional clients in exchange for the ability to
acquire more assets under management. Or, an adviser may use its voting
power to support the activism of its own shareholders at the advisor's
portfolio companies in exchange for those shareholders agreeing not to target
the adviser itself for such activism. The result is that an adviser has not cast
its delegated voting authority "in a manner consistent with the best interest
of its client"' and has subrogated the "client interests to its own," 9 a breach

in its fiduciary duties to its mutual fund clients and its shareholders.
These examples demonstrate a certain type of agency cost, the "proactive"
agency costs of agency capitalism.'o Agency capitalism arises, as it has in
the U.S. equity markets, when institutional investors such as mutual fund
advisers not retail investors who provide the funds, come to dominate the
voting of common stock and other voting instruments. According to the
publication Pensions & Investments, institutional investors currently own
approximately eighty percent of the market value of U.S. publicly traded
equities." This compares to approximately six percent in 1950.12 Agency
7. John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance PartI: The Problem of
Twelve, SSRN (Sept. 20, 2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
3247337 (referencing the "Problem of Twelve" which means that twelve individuals will
hold voting power over U.S. companies).
8. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. While this is the first paper where these agency costs of agency capitalism are
defined as being "proactive," I do discuss, without definition, this particular type of
agency cost in several blog posts. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Mutual Fund Advisors'
"Empty Voting" Raises New GovernanceIssues, COLUM. L. SCH.: BLUE SKY BLOG (July
3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/03/mutual-fund-advisors-emptyvoting-raises-new-govemance-issues/ [hereinafter Empty Voting]; Bernard S. Sharfman,

On Governance: The First Critique of the 'Frameworkfor US. Stewardship and
Governance, THE CONF. BOARD CORP. GOVERNANCE CTR. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2017), https://
www.conference-board.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6655;
Bernard S. Sharfman,
Commentary: Reforming a Broken System, PENSIONS & INV. (Aug. 27, 2018), http://
www.pionline.com/article/20180827/ONLINE/180829997/commentary-reforming-a-

&

broken-system; Bernard S. Sharfman, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism and
CorporateLaw, DEL. CORP. AND COM. LITIGATION BLOG (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www
.delawarelitigation.com/2018/08/articles/commentary/the-agency-costs-of-agencycapitalism-and-corporate-law/.
11. Charles McGrath, 80% ofEquity Market Cap Held by Institutions, PENSIONS

INV. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170
429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions.
12. MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT
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costs of agency capitalism are generated when an institutional investor
utilizes its voting power to satisfy its own preferences (and thereby
enhancing the welfare of the institutional investor or its managers) and not
the preferences of investors who have provided it with the funds to purchase
securities.
The understanding that proactive agency costs of agency capitalism exist
is nothing new. For example, the SEC Release, Disclosure ofProxy Voting
Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, the companion release ("Companion Release") 3 to the release
implementing the Proxy Voting Rule, recognized the agency costs generated
when mutual fund advisers are reluctant to vote against a company's
management for fear of losing the company's retirement business. 14 Even
though it was not labeled as such, this type of agency cost falls in the
proactive category.
Articles by Gilson and Gordon, and by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst also
focus on the economic disincentives mutual fund advisers have in becoming
informed prior to voting their proxies." These can be referred to as the
"passive" agency costs of agency capitalism. Therefore, this Article is
distinguished from those articles by its recognition of additional types of
agency costs of agency capitalism that fall into the proactive category, as
well as the use of the term "proactive," and by categorizing the agency costs
generated by the economic disincentives that discourage mutual fund
advisers from becoming sufficiently informed voters as falling in the passive
category.
This Article does not address the passive agency costs of agency
capitalism or the agency costs traditionally associated with public
companies.1
Instead, the focus of this Article is only on the proactive

(2010).
13. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-25922
(Jan. 31,2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7,2003) [hereinafter Disclosure of Proxy Voting
Policies], https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm (accompanying the release on
the proxy voting rule).
14. See discussion infra, Section II.
15. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
InstitutionalInvestors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 95 (2017); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism:Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889-95 (2013).
16. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for
CorporateLaw and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 775 (2017) ("[T]he economic
losses resulting from managers' natural incentive to advance their personal interests even
when those interests conflict with the goal of maximizing their firm's value."); see also
Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation,63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1361
REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 22 TBL.10
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agency costs generated by mutual fund advisers that hold large
concentrations of delegated voting power. These are the agency costs that
the SEC can help mitigate.
To combat the proactive agency costs of agency capitalism, the
Commission should provide clarification that mutual fund advisers must
disclose how they will deal with these new conflicts in their voting policies,
consistent with their fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of their
mutual fund clients and their shareholders.
In addition, shareholder
proposals are a prime area where this opportunistic use of an adviser's voting
power may be in play. Therefore, the adviser's voting policy must also
explain how voting on these proposals are linked to maximizing shareholder
value.
Furthermore, the Commission should clarify that voting inconsistent with
these new policies and procedures or omission of such policies and
procedures will be considered a breach of the Proxy Voting Rule.' 7 Such
guidance should apply to any mutual fund adviser that is delegated voting
authority. I urge the SEC to be diligent in enforcing breaches of the Proxy
Voting Rule.
Finally, this article shares much of the same textual language with the
October 8, 2018 comment letter I wrote to the Commission's staff roundtable
on the proxy process." Given that the reader has been provided this

n.17 (2010) (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECoN. 305
(1976)) ("Under a classic theory of the firm, agency costs in the corporate context
increase as ownership is separated from control. As the manager's ownership of shares
in the firm decreases as a percentage of the total, the manager will bear a diminishing
fraction of the costs of any nonpecuniary benefits he takes out in maximizing his own
utility. To prevent the manager from maximizing his utility at the expense of the
shareholders, shareholders will seek to constrain the manager's behavior by aligning the
manager's interests with the shareholders' interests."); id. at 1361-62 (citations omitted)
(explaining that these agency costs are the province of corporate law and its fiduciary
requirements).
17. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
18. Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to Mr. Brent J. Fields, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-4555147-176184.
pdf I also wrote three other comment letters to the SEC's staff roundtable on the proxy
process in the fall of 2018, and all four comment letters focused on the fiduciary duties
required of institutional investors who are regulated under the authority of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act") by virtue of being defined as investment advisers.
See Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to Mr. Brent J. Fields, Sec'y, Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-4513625175932.pdf, reprinted in

HARV. L. SCH. FOR. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG.

(Nov. 2, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/02/comment-letter-in-advance
-of-sec-staff-roundtable-on-the-proxy-process/; Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to Mr.
Brent J. Fields, Sec'y, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/co
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knowledge upfront, I do not believe it is necessary to continuously footnote
quotes and cites from this comment letter.
Part II of the Article discusses the Proxy Voting Rule and the fiduciary
duties of mutual fund advisers when voting their proxies. Part III discusses
how the SEC has historically dealt with the proactive agency costs of agency
capitalism. Part IV describes the ever-increasing voting power of mutual
fund advisers, how it may lead to proactive agency costs of agency
capitalism, and what the SEC can do to mitigate them.
II. THE PROXY VOTING RULE AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES

The Proxy Voting Rule requires mutual fund advisers, as registered
investment advisers who have been delegated shareholder voting authority,
to create and disclose their proxy voting policies and records:
If you are an investment adviser registered or required to be registered
under section 203 of the Act, it is a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
act, practice or course of business within the meaning of section 206(4) of
the Act, for you to exercise voting authority with respect to client
securities, unless you:
(a) Adopt and implement written policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to ensure that you vote client securities in the best
interest of clients, which procedures must include how you address
material conflicts that may arise between your interests and those of your
clients;
(b) Disclose to clients how they may obtain information from you about
how you voted with respect to their securities; and
(c) Describe to clients your proxy voting policies and procedures and,
upon request, furnish a copy of the policies and procedures to the
requesting client.19

This rule rests on two important premises. First, under the holding in SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. ,20 the Investment Advisers Act of

1940 ("Advisers Act") imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers,
including mutual fund advisers. 2 ' Second, the objective of this fiduciary duty
mments/4-725/4725-4684881-176574.pdf;

Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to Mr.

Brent J. Fields, Sec'y, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Dec.

gov/comments/4-725/4725-4780983-176889.pdf

17, 2018), https://www.sec.

However, while the first targeted the

fiduciary duties of mutual fund advisers when voting client securities, the last three
focused on the fiduciary duties of proxy advisers, namely Institutional Shareholder
Services and Glass Lewis.

19. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2018) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
20. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
21. See also Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1979)
("As we have previously recognized, § 206 establishes 'federal fiduciary standards' to
govern the conduct of investment advisers. Indeed, the Act's legislative history leaves
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is shareholder wealth maximization.
A.

The FiduciaryDuty ofMutual FundAdvisers

As stated in the Release, "[u]nder the Advisers Act ... an adviser is a
fiduciary that owes each of its clients duties of care and loyalty with respect
to all services undertaken on the client's behalf, including proxy voting." 2 2
Moreover, "[t]o satisfy its duty of loyalty, the adviser must cast the proxy
votes in a manner consistent with the best interestof its client and must not
subrogate client interests to its own." 23 This fiduciary duty extends to the
shareholders of mutual funds:
The investment adviser to a mutual fund is a fiduciary that owes the fund
a duty of utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure. This fiduciary
duty extends to all functions undertaken on the fund's behalf, including
the voting of proxies relating to the fund's portfolio securities. An
investment adviser voting proxies on behalf of a fund, therefore, must do
so in a manner consistent with the best interests of the fund and its
shareholders. 24
B.

Shareholder Wealth Maximization is the Objective of the Fiduciary
Duty

Second, the objective of this fiduciary duty is wealth maximization.
According to the Companion Release, "the amendments [regarding proxy
voting disclosure] will provide better information to investors who wish to
determine: ...
whether their existing fund managers are adequately
maximizing the value of their shares."25 This release also noted that "proxy
voting decisions may play an important role in maximizing the value of a
fund's investments for its shareholders," and can have "an enormous impact
on the financial livelihood of millions of Americans."26 In sum, the

no doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.").
22. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 1; see SEC Staff Legal
Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF) (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20],
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm (reaffirming the fiduciary approach from
the final rule on proxy voting); Proposed Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard
of Conduct for Investment Advisers; Request for Comment on Enhancing Investment
Adviser Regulation, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-4889 (Apr. 18, 2018), 83
Fed. Reg. 21203 (May 9, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2018/ia-4889.pdf.
23. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
24. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 13 (emphasis added).
25. Id. (emphasis added) (Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2106 and
Investment Company Act Release No. 25922 were published as companion pieces in the
Federal Register).
26. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 13.
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requirement of shareholder wealth maximization does not stop with portfolio
management, it also must be adhered to when a mutual fund adviser votes
the shares it has been delegated.
This objective is also consistent with the premise that the overwhelming
majority of investors, including retail investors, simply want to earn the
highest risk adjusted financial return possible,27 including when they vote or
have votes cast by investment advisers. Moreover, I believe this desire to
earn the highest risk adjusted financial return possible is also shared by the
overwhelming number of socially motivated investors who align their
investments based on their moral or social values, 28 even though they give
up some risk-adjusted return in terms of portfolio diversification and the
possibility of losing out on the returns generated by those finite number of
high performing stocks that allow the stock market to earn returns above
Treasury rates 29 and may pay higher management fees for this customization.
That is, these investors are willing to exclude certain stocks from their
portfolios because they find them to be socially undesirable, but are still
27. Paul Brest, Ronald Gilson & Mark Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can 't)
Create Social Value, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://ssir.org/up
for debate/article/how investors can and cant create social value; see also George
David Banks & Bernard Sharfman, Standing Up for the Retail Investor, HARV. L. SCH.
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.e
du/2018/06/10/standing-up-for-the-retail-investor/ (explaining the new advocacy group,
Main Street Investors Coalition, which aims to "reunite voting rights with those who
actually take the economic risk, the retail investor").
28. See Brest, Gilson & Wolfson, supranote 27 ("Socially motivated investors who
seek value alignment would prefer to own stocks only in companies that act in
accordance with their moral or social values. Independent of having any effect on the
company's behavior, these investors may wish to affirmatively express their identities
by owning stock in what they deem to be a good company, or to avoid "dirty hands" or
complicity by refusing to own stock in what they deem to be a bad company. Valuealigned investors may be concerned with a firm's outputs - its products and services;
for example, they might want to own stock in a solar power company or avoid owning
shares in a cigarette company. Or the investors may be concerned with a firm's practices
- the way it produces its outputs; they might want to own stock in companies that meet
high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, and eschew companies
with poor ESG ratings. To achieve their goals, value-aligned investors must only
examine their personal values and then learn whether the company's behavior promotes
or conflicts with those values.").
29. Hendrik Bessembinder, Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, 129 J. FIN.
EcON. 440, 440 (2018). Bessembinder observed that there is a significant amount of
positive skewness in the returns of individual public companies that have made up the
stock market from July 1926 to December 2016. He found that "in terms of lifetime
dollar wealth creation the best-performing 4% of listed companies explain the net gain
for the entire US stock market since 1926, as other stocks collectively matched Treasury
bills." Id. at 440, 454, tbl.5 (defining wealth creation as "accumulated December 2016
value in excess of the outcome that would have been obtained if the invested capital had
earned one-month Treasury bill returns").
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looking for the highest risk adjusted return possible given their investment
constraints.
It also must be noted that this objective is consistent with corporate law's
understanding of why shareholder voting adds value to corporate
governance: "[w]hat legitimizes the stockholder vote as a decision-making
mechanism is the premise that stockholders with economic ownership are
expressing their collective view as to whether a particular course of action
serves the corporate goal of stockholder wealth maximization."3 0
Finally, shareholder wealth maximization as the objective of shareholder
voting is also consistent with the rationale for why profit making companies
create so much value for society. As SEC Commissioner Peirce reminds us
in a recent speech at the University of Michigan Law School:
The hunt for profit drives companies to strive to identify and meet people's
needs using as few resources as possible. Companies communicate with
their customers and suppliers through the price system. People tell
companies what they value when they pay for the products and services
those companies offer. Suppliers, by raising or lowering prices, tell
companies how valuable the resources are that the companies use.
Companies respond to what their customers and suppliers tell them. In
this way, companies help to ensure that people spend their time wisely and
that resources are used for the things society values most. Companies
combine the diverse and complementary talents of their employees to
research, develop, explore, produce, sell, and provide services to willing
customers. In these activities, corporations play an important role in
expanding scientific and technological knowledge, enabling people to
profit from their hard work, and ensuring that society's resources are
allocated to the uses we most value.31

III. THE SEC AND THE PROACTIVE AGENCY COSTS OF AGENCY
CAPITALISM
The Release and the Companion Release, with its particular emphasis on
mutual fund advisers, were promulgated in 2003 to address concerns that an
investment adviser may vote its own preferences, not the preferences of its

30. Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff'd, Crown Emak
Partners v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388-89 (Del. 2010) (quoting Kurz with approval).
31. Hester M. Peirce, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Wolves and Wolverines:
Remarks at the University of Michigan Law School (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.g
ov/news/speech/speech-peirce-092418.
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funds and their shareholders. If that were to occur, then an adviser would be
in breach of its fiduciary duties and shareholder wealth maximization may
not occur. In what fact patterns would this happen?
In the Companion Release, the SEC focused on the concern that mutual
fund advisers would, in some situations, be reluctant to vote against
management for fear that doing so would "threaten their ability to retain that
company as a client for corporate retirement fund assets."32 As stated in the
Companion Release:
[I]n some situations the interests of a mutual fund's shareholders may
conflict with those of its investment adviser with respect to proxy voting.
This may occur, for example, when a fund's adviser also manages or seeks
to manage the retirement plan assets of a company whose securities are
held by the fund. In these situations, a fund's adviser may have an
incentive to support management recommendations to further its business
interests. 33

For example, in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, Todd
Henderson and Dorothy Shapiro Lund discuss how an activist hedge fund,
acting with the support of the two leading proxy advisors, was allegedly
impeded in moving forward on its proxy contest because several large
mutual fund advisers balked at voting to support the hedge fund's director
nominees for fear of losing the company's retirement fund business. 34 This
type of conflict of interest, a classic example of the agency costs that can be
generated by mutual fund advisers, has been well documented and, according
to Cvijanovi6, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis, appears to persist despite the
implementation of the Proxy Voting Rule. 35 Thus, as far back as 2003, the
SEC had recognized a type of proactive agency cost of agency capitalism but
without identifying it as such.
Another type of conflict noted in the Release, and the one most relevant
to the discussion below, is where "[t]he adviser may also have business or
personal relationships with other proponents of proxy proposals, participants

&

32. M. Todd Henderson & Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Index Funds Are Great for
Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance, WALL STREET J. (June 23, 2017, 6:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-great-for-investors-risky-for-corporategovernance-1498170623.
33. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supranote 13; see also Bebchuk, Cohen
Hirst, supra note 15 ("[T]he agency problems of institutional investors can be expected
.

to lead them to . . . side excessively with corporate managers. .

34. Henderson & Lund, supra note 32.
35. Dragana Cvijanovid, Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Ties That
Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism, 71 J. FiN. 2933, 2934
(2016).
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in proxy contests, corporate directors or candidates for directorships." 3 6 For
example, such a conflict may exist where "the adviser may manage money
for an employee group." 37
Such a conflict was described in the SEC's enforcement case against
INTECH.3 8 Here, the registered investment adviser, INTECH Investment
Management LLC, had initially voted its proxies based on an Institutional
Shareholder Services recommendation platform that was purposely designed
to side with management. Between 2003 and 2006, INTECH moved to a
different ISS recommendation platform that followed the voting
recommendations of the AFL-CIO.3 9 According to footnote 3 of the SEC's
order instituting proceedings, such voting recommendations intended to
promote a "position that is consistent with the long-term economic best
interests of plan members embodied in the principle of a worker-owner view
of value." 4 0 Apparently, this approach was significantly different than the
one taken in the original recommendation platform.
INTECH switched to this new platform in order "to retain and obtain
business from existing and prospective union-affiliated clients." 4 1 Soon
after, some of INTECH's original clients started making inquiries regarding
the higher number of votes against management on shareholder proposals. 4 2
INTECH made the switch in voting platforms without having any written
procedures or policies that addressed material potential conflicts between
INTECH's interests in seeking more union-affiliated clients and those of its
clients who did not favor the AFL-CIO. 43 By doing so, it had subrogated its
client interests to its own, a breach in its fiduciary duty of loyalty. Therefore,
this was a clear violation of the Proxy Voting Rule. INTECH paid a civil
penalty of $300,000.44
Most importantly, this is an example of how the SEC has recognized
another type of proactive agency cost of agency capitalism and has taken
36. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 1.
37. Id. at n.4.
38. Order Instituting Administrative Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to
Sections 203(e), 203(f) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Making
Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order, File No. 313463 (May 7, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/ia-2872.pdf.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 4 n.3.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 4-5.
44. Id. at 7; see SEC Brings Second Case Alleging Improper Proxy Voting by an
Adviser, ROPES & GRAY (May 20, 2009), https://www.ropesgray.com/-/media/Files/aler
ts/2009/05/sec-brings-second-case-alleging-improper-proxy-voting-by-an-adviser.pdf
(an excellent discussion of the INTECH settlement).
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action to mitigate it. However, there are more proactive agency costs to be
dealt with and most likely more SEC enforcement actions to be initiated.
IV. THE EVER-INCREASING VOTING POWER OF MUTUAL FUND ADVISERS
AND PROACTIVE AGENCY COSTS OF AGENCY CAPITALISM

This Part describes the ever-increasing voting power of mutual fund
advisers, how it may lead to proactive agency costs of agency capitalism,
and what the SEC can do to mitigate them.
A.

The Increasing Voting Power ofMutual Fund Advisers

Of course, the world has changed since the Proxy Voting Rule first went
into effect in 2003. Currently, an unprecedented concentration of voting
power now resides in the hands of our largest mutual fund advisers. For
example, the Big Three now control enormous amounts of proxy voting
power without having any economic interest in the shares they vote.
According to Shenkar, Heemskerk, and Fichtner, this concentration of voting
power was and is being caused by a large shift from actively managed equity
funds to equity index funds:
In contrast to the fragmented and sizeable group of actively managed
mutual funds, the fast-growing index fund sector is highly concentrated.
It is dominated by just three giant U.S. asset managers: BlackRock,
Vanguard and State Street - what we call the "Big Three." Together they
stand for a stunning seventy-one percent of the entire Exchange Traded
Fund (ETF) market and manage over ninety percent of all Assets under
Management . . in passive equity funds. As a consequence of this leading
role in the market for passive investment, the Big Three have become
dominant shareholders. Seen together, the Big Three are the largest single
shareholder in almost ninety percent of all S&P 500 firms, including
Apple, Microsoft, ExxonMobil, General Electric and Coca-Cola. Such
concentration of corporate ownership is remarkable and may not have
been seen since the days of the Gilded Age. 45

This new concentration of voting power originated in the industry practice
of centralizing mutual funds' votes into the hands of their advisor's corporate
governance department. In essence, not only would portfolio management
be delegated to the mutual fund adviser, but also the voting of proxies. I
refer to this as the "empty voting of mutual fund advisers." 46 That is, they
have the voting rights but not the economic interest in the underlying shares.
This low cost approach to proxy voting was innocuous enough when
proxy voting was not concentrated. However, as the market share of equity
45. See Shenkar, Heemskerk & Fichtner, supranote 5.
46. Empty Voting, supra note 10.
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index funds has grown, this empty voting has given rise to an unintended
consequence.47 The Big Three now control, without having any economic
interest in the underlying shares, the voting rights associated with trillions of
dollars' worth of equity securities. For example, as of December 31, 2017,
BlackRock had over $6.3 trillion of assets under management, with almost
$3.4 trillion of those assets being equity securities. 48 This represents an
astonishing amount of voting control. Therefore, at many public companies,
the respective corporate governance departments of the Big Three, as well
as other large mutual fund advisers, may now control the fate of a
shareholder or management proposal, whether a nominated director receives
a required majority of votes to remain on the board of directors, or if a proxy
contest succeeds or fails.
B.

The CourtingofPublic Pension FundAssets

Such a concentration of power always brings with it the potential for
abuse. It is easy to envision scenarios where this voting power can generate
significant value for the advisor if it decided to vote in a certain way, whether
or not it is in the best interests of its clients to do so. In essence, the large
mutual fund adviser will be tempted to breach its fiduciary duties and
monetize or take special advantage of the delegated voting power it has
accumulated.
One scenario where a large mutual fund adviser may be tempted to
monetize its newly found voting power is to vote in unison with public
pension and union-related funds, such as on shareholder proposals these
funds initiate or promote, if the vote will lead to bringing more assets under
management. Public pension funds control approximately $4.3 trillion in
assets, 4 9 a prime target for a mutual fund adviser looking to increase the size
of its mutual funds, especially its equity index funds. Since the objective of
an index fund is not to beat the market, but simply to match it, increasing
profitability through increased assets under management is a critical business
strategy for the adviser.
Public pension funds and union-related funds are leaders in the
shareholder empowerment movement. This form of shareholder activism

47. Bernard S. Sharfman, Dual Class Share Voting versus the "Empty Voting" of
Mutual Fund Advisors', CONF. BOARD CORP. GOVERNANCE BLOG (July 2, 2018),
https://www.conference-board.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6812&blogid=8.
48. BLACKROCK, INC., BLACKROCK 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 2, http://ir.blackrock.
com/Cache/1500109547.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1500109547&iid=40482
87.
49. Public Pension FundAssets: Quarterly Update (Q2 2018), NAT'L Ass'N OF ST.
RETIREMENT ADMINS., https://www.nasra.org/content.asp?contentid=200 (on file with
author).
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advocates shifting corporate decision-making authority to shareholders, and
thus away from boards of directors and executive management, and arguably
without regard to the impact on the value of a public company's stock. That
is, satisfaction with company performance does not factor into the decision
to support a proposal that shifts decision making away from the board of
directors.
For example, consider the shareholder empowerment movement's takeno-prisoners approach to dual class share structures even though these
structures have been successfully used by companies such as Berkshire
Hathaway, Facebook, Comcast, Nike, and Alphabet (Google).so Such
zealous advocacy should not be a surprise since dual class shares are an
obvious threat to the movement's power. As I have previously observed,
"the more public companies that utilize a dual-class share structure, the more
controlled companies exist and the less power the movement has."" Or, as
another example, the New York City Public Pension Funds' crusade to
implement proxy access at all public companies without regard to an
individual company's performance.1 2
Incidentally, based on their 2018 voting guidelines,53 the Big Three
unanimously support a standardized form of proxy access and equal voting
rights. This should be no surprise as it is consistent with their own
preferences for retaining or increasing their public pension and union-related
funds business.
Shareholder empowerment reflects an agreement with the following
theory as articulated by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine:
[T]here is only one set of agents who must be constrained-corporate
managers-and the world will be made a better place when corporations
become direct democracies subject to immediate influence on many levels

50. Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private OrderingDefense of a Company's Right to Use
Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018).
51. Bernard Sharfman, Dual-class Shares and the Shareholder Empowerment
Movement, R STREET INST. BLOG (June 12, 2017), https://www.rstreet.org/2017/06/12/d
ual-class-shares-and-the-shareholder-empowerment-movement/.
52. Press Release, City of N.Y., Office of Comptroller, Comptroller Stringer, NYC
Funds: After Three Years of Advocacy, "Proxy Access" Now Close to a Market
Standard (Jan. 30, 2018), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringernyc-funds-after-three-years-of-advocacy-proxy-access-now-close-to-a-marketstandard/.
53. STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, PROXY VOTING AND
GUIDELINES NORTH AMERICA (UNITED STATES & CANADA) 4

ENGAGEMENT

(Mar. 2018),
https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/viewpoints/2018-proxy-voting-and-engagementguidelines-north-america.html; BLACKROCK, INC., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S.
SECURITIES 8 (Feb. 2018); Policies and Guidelines, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.

com/investment-stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/ (discussing proxy voting).
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from a stockholder majority comprised not of those whose money is
ultimately at stake, but of the money manager agents who wield the endusers' money to buy and sell stocks for their benefit. 54

Such a theory ignores the continued need for the decision-making
authority of the board of directors, as the most informed locus of authority
in a corporation, to take precedence over the accountability that can be
provided by the agents of investors, institutional shareholders such as mutual
fund advisers, through their ability to vote and engage on corporate matters.
As I have stated in the past, "corporate law concentrates decision-making
authority in the Board because it recognizes that a centralized, hierarchical
authority is necessary for the successful management of a corporation,
especially if it is a public company."55 This is the only way that shareholder
wealth maximization can be achieved.
I cannot overstate the harm caused by an institutional investor adopting a

shareholder empowerment approach to corporate governance. This is
particularly true when it comes to the private ordering of corporate
governance arrangements. Shareholder empowerment is a one-size-fits-all
approach and should not be confused with our traditional understanding of
private ordering. This understanding assumes that, "observed governance
choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders
and management."

56

For example, it may or may not include such corporate

governance arrangements as dual class shares (with or without time-based
sunset provisions),5 ' staggered boards, or super-majority shareholder voting.
That is the whole point of private ordering and why it has value; it "allows
the internal affairs of each corporation to be tailored to its own attributes and
qualities, including its personnel, culture, maturity as a business, and
governance practices. ,,51

54. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the DuelingIdeologicalMythologists ofCorporateLaw, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 451 (2014).
55. Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World ofBoard Independence:
Creators or Destroyers of Long - Term Value?, 2015 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 813, 821
(2015).
56. David Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to CorporateGovernance Regulation,
101 J. FIN. EcoN. 431, 431 (2011) (emphasis added).
57. See Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to Elizabeth King, Chief Regulatory
Officer, Intercontinental Exch. Inc. (Mar. 21, 2019); Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to
John Zecca, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel, N. Am. & Chief Regulatory Officer,
NASDAQ Stock Mkt. (Mar. 21, 2019). Both letters are reprinted in full at Bernard S.
Sharfman, Comment Letters to Nasdaq andNYSE: Time-Based Sunsets and the Problem
of Early Unifications of Dual Class Share Structures, SSRN (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3352177.
58. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open
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Private ordering that results from shareholder empowerment disregards
what is wealth maximizing for shareholders at each company. I refer to this
phenomenon as the "bastardization of private ordering" or "sub-optimal
private ordering." When a mutual fund adviser adopts voting policies that
include sub-optimal private ordering, whether or not they are inspired by a
desire to retain or increase assets under management, it is a breach of its
fiduciary duty under the Proxy Voting Rule. That is, the breach is a result of
a failure to disclose how such voting policies adequately maximize the
wealth of its mutual fund clients and their shareholders.59
Recommendation: Consistent with the Proxy Voting Rule's requirement
that mutual fund advisers vote their proxies in the best interests of their
clients, mutual fund advisers who have obtained concentrated voting power
due to the delegation of voting authority, must disclose in their voting
policies the proceduresthey will use to eliminate the temptation to use their
delegated voting power to retain or acquire more public pension and unionrelated fund assets under management.
C.

Appeasing the Mutual FundAdviser's Own ShareholderActivists

A mutual fund adviser may also utilize its delegated voting power to
appease shareholder activists who attack the business decisions, procedures,
and objectives of the adviser's management. For example, in early 2017,
both BlackRock 6 0 and Vanguard (two of its equity funds received the
proposals, 500 Index Fund and Total Stock Market Index Fund)6 1 "received
shareholder resolutions from Walden Asset Management requesting a
review of their proxy voting policies and practices related to climate
change." 6 2 Yet, the clear intent of the proposals was not just to review, but
to encourage the advisers to be stronger supporters of climate change
proposals. According to the language in both proposals:

Meeting to Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations (May 20, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.
htm (emphasis added).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
60. Review and Report on ESG Proxy Voting (BLK, 2017 Resolution), CERES,
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceresengagementdetailpage?reclD=a01120000050dxT
AAS [hereinafter BlackRock Report] (filed by Walden Asset Management).
61. Vanguard Funds, Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) at 2-3 (Aug. 21,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34066/000093247117004594/prel4ap
roxystatement.htm [hereinafter Vanguard Proxy Statement].
62. Rob Berridge, FourMutual Fund GiantsBegin to Address Climate Change Risks
in Proxy Votes: How About Your Funds?, CERES (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.ceres.org
/news-center/blog/four-mutual-fund-giants-begin-address-climate-change-risks-proxyvotes-how-about.
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Vanguard [BlackRock] is a prestigious member of the Principles for
Responsible Investment (PRI) a global network of investors and asset
owners representing more than $62 trillion in assets. One of the Principles
encourages investors to vote conscientiously on ESG issues. 63
Yet Vanguard [BlackRock] funds' publicly reported proxy voting records
reveals [sic] consistent votes against all climate related resolutions (except
the few supported by management), such as requests for enhanced
disclosure or adoption of greenhouse gas reduction goals, even when
independent experts advance a strong business and economic case for
support.64

As worded, the submitted proposals were intended to dictate to both
BlackRock and Vanguard how they were to fulfill their fiduciary duties
under the Proxy Voting Rule.
It appears that the tactic worked. Walden Asset Management withdrew
both proposals in return for commitments by the companies to address the
request. 65 Moreover, both companies started to support 2-Degree Scenario
Proposals, something neither company did prior to 2017.
Coincidentally or not, subsequent to the agreement with Walden Asset
Management, both companies had the exact same record on 2-Degree
Scenario Proposals. In 2017, both BlackRock and Vanguard voted in favor
of 2-Degree Scenario proposals at ExxonMobil and Occidental (both
proposals received majority support); 6 6 while voting against 2-Degree
Scenario proposals at twelve other companies.67
It is important to point out just how valuable the voting power of these two
advisers is to climate change activists and why it should be expected that the
Big Three will continue to use their power to maintain peace with climate
change activists who are also shareholders. According to a 50/50 Climate
Project report, if BlackRock had voted 100 percent of their mutual fund
shares in support of the twelve other 2-Degree Scenario proposals, even
without Vanguard's, ten of the twelve rejected proposals would have
received majority support. 68 If Vanguard had done the same, even without
BlackRock's support, eight out of twelve additional proposals would have

63. BlackRock Report, supra note 60.
64. Vanguard Proxy Statement, supra note 61 (showing Walden Asset
Management's identical proposals for both Vanguard and BlackRock).
65. Berridge, supra note 62.
66. Id.
67. MARKA PETERSON, JIM BAKER & KIMBERLY GLADMAN, ASSET MANAGERS AND
CLIMATE-RELATED SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS: REPORT ON KEY CLIMATE VOTES, THE
50/50 CLIMATE PROJECT 14, 19 (Mar. 2018), https://5050climate.org/wp-content/

uploads/2018/03/AM-Report-3-13-FINAL.pdf
68. Id. at 14.
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received majority support.69
In sum, this is another scenario where a mutual fund adviser may be
tempted to trade its voting power for something that would be of value to it,
no matter how it impinges on the fiduciary duties it owes to its mutual fund
clients and their shareholders. Here, activists imbedded in an adviser's
shareholder base are telling the adviser how to go about implementing its
fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Proxy
Voting Rule.
Recommendation: Mutual fund advisers must disclose how they will
eliminate the pressures placed on them by their own shareholders when
voting their proxies. Such pressures deserve the creation of a wall that needs
to be disclosed pursuant to the Proxy Voting Rule. Such a wall will allow
them to fulfill the fiduciary duties they owe their clients.
D.

Voting Policies on ShareholderProposalsand Wealth
Maximization

Shareholder proposals provide a significant opportunity for mutual fund
advisers to abuse their voting power for purposes other than shareholder
wealth maximization. In 2017, at least 911 shareholder proposals were
submitted to public companies for voting at their annual meetings. 70 Of
these, at least 502 went to a vote.
Unfortunately, many of these proposals have nothing to do with
shareholder wealth maximization and may ultimately end up having a
negative impact. A recent study by Kalt and Turki found that the adoption
of climate change resolutions "has no statistically significant impact on
company returns one way or the other." 72 They also found that this result
should not be surprising:
[T]here is no general expectation that corporate managers have special
abilities in predicting tastes, preferences, voting behavior, and/or
institutional capabilities across a wide and varied number of independent
political actors operating within independently acting nations across the
globe. Under such conditions, resolutions that, for example, compel
disclosure of outcomes under particular political scenarios (e.g., the

69. Id. at 20.
70. E-mail from Sebastian V. Niles, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to
Bernard S. Sharfman (June 22, 2018, 11:22 EST) (on file with author).
71. Id.
72. JOSEPH P. KALT ET AL., POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS: Do THEY CREATE OR DESTROY SHAREHOLDER VALUE? 3
(June 2018), MAINSTREET INVESTORS, https://mainstreetinvestors.org/wp-content/uploa
ds/2018/06/ESG-Paper-FINAL.pdf
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political paths that might put the world on a trajectory to achieve a goal
such as the "not more than 2 degrees temperature rise" goal that came out
of the Paris climate accords in 2015) do not add materially to the
information already available to investors from other sources. As such,
73
they cannot be expected to add to shareholder value.

Matsusaka, Ozbas, and Yi found that labor unions use shareholder
proposals as bargaining chips to extract side payments from management.74
Matsusaka, Ozbas, and Yi, in a separate paper, found that the stock market
reacted positively when the SEC permitted shareholder proposals to be
excluded.
Moreover, it is not difficult to assume that shareholder proposals that deal
with human rights, political contributions, lobbying disclosure, greenhouse
gas emissions, climate change, etc. are most likely not submitted for
purposes of shareholder wealth maximization.
This is something that
activists most likely understand from the outset. Instead, the submission of
such proposals is to try and resolve issues of national and international
importance through shareholder activism, not the political process.
I do not mean to say that such issues are not extremely important to all of
us. However, submitting shareholder proposals is not the way to solve them.
According to Kalt and Turki,
None of this is to say that we should not be extremely concerned about
such issues as global climate change, human trafficking, cybersecurity,
and the like. Effectively dealing with such problems, however, will require
that wise public policy measures be taken across a wide swath of the
world's nations. While frustration with slow progress on this front is
73. Id. at 3-4.
74. John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by
Union Shareholders (Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 17-3, 2018), https://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2666064 ("We find that in contract
expiration years compared to nonexpiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by
one fifth, particularly proposals concerning executive compensation, while nonunion
shareholders do not increase their proposal rate in expiration years. Union proposals
made during expiration years are less likely to be supported by other shareholders or a
leading proxy advisor; the market reacts negatively to union proposals in expiration
years; and withdrawn union proposals are accompanied with higher wage settlements.").
75. John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Can Shareholder Proposals
Hurt Shareholders?Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions (Marshall Sch. of
Bus., Working Paper No. 17-7, 2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ractid=2881408 ("We find that over the period 2007-2016, the market reacted
positively when the SEC permitted exclusion. Investors appear to have been most
skeptical about proposals related to corporate governance and proposals at high profit
firms, suggesting that investors believe some proposals can hurt shareholders by
disrupting companies that are already performing well. The evidence is compatible with
the view that managerial resistance is based on a genuine concern that proposals can
harm firm value.").
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understandably accompanied by the desire to "do something[,]" doing
something effective in such arenas is the task of our political institutions.
Shareholder resolutions targeted at prominent corporations is an
ineffectual substitute for sound policy making via the political institutions
of democracy.76

This lack of connection between shareholder proposals and shareholder
wealth maximization is an issue that should concern all retail investors.
Shareholder proposals, if implemented subsequent to a shareholder vote, or
prior to through the process of engagement, while perhaps not reducing
shareholder wealth, may at best do nothing to enhance it. If so, then wealth
maximizing opportunities may be foregone as finite company resources are
devoted to responding to and subsequently implementing these proposals.
Recommendation: Mutual fund advisers must disclose in their voting
policies the procedures they utilize to identify an actual link between support
for a shareholder proposal and the enhancement of shareholder value. This
is necessary to make sure that mutual fund advisers are complying with a
primary objective of their fiduciary duties: "adequately maximizing the
value of their shares."
V. CONCLUSION
In 2003, the SEC made the following statement in the Release:
Investment advisers registered with us have discretionary authority to
manage $19 trillion of assets on behalf of their clients, including large
holdings in equity securities. In most cases, clients give these advisers
authority to vote proxies relating to equity securities. This enormous
voting power gives advisers significant ability collectively, and in many
cases individually, to affect the outcome of shareholder votes and
influence the governance of corporations. Advisers are thus in a position
to significantly affect the future of corporations and, as a result, the future
value of corporate securities held by their clients.
This is truer today than it was in 2003, and will most likely be truer in
2023, especially in terms of mutual fund advisers and their ability to generate
proactive agency costs of agency capitalism. 78 Therefore, the SEC must
become more active in helping to mitigate these costs.
In TransamericaMortgage Advisors v. Lewis,79 the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that clients and their shareholders have no express or implied private
right of action under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
By extension, no private right of action exists under the Proxy Voting Rule.
76. KALT ET AL., supra note 72, at 4.
77. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 13 (emphasis added).
78. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
79. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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Therefore, it is imperative that the Commission clarify the scope of a mutual
fund adviser's fiduciary duties under the Proxy Voting Rule as an integral
part of the amendments it is considering to the proxy process.
According to Laby, "[b]y adopting rules and prosecuting enforcement
actions, . . . the SEC fills in the details of what is required by the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care, and brings uniformity to the industry."so
Unfortunately, there has been too little guidance provided by the SEC since
it implemented the Proxy Voting Rule in 2003. The only guidance is the
INTECH enforcement action and a staff legal bulletin: a bulletin that focuses
on proxy advisors and does not address the issue of how proxy voting policy
disclosures needs to be updated to conform to our current proxy voting
environment." An update to the process is long overdue.
In a proxy voting world where voting is dominated by a handful of
extremely large investment advisers, the Commission should provide
clarification that mutual fund advisers must disclose in their voting policies,
consistent with the Proxy Voting Rule's requirement that they vote proxies
in the best interests of their clients, the proceduresthey will use to deal with
the temptation to use their voting power to retain or acquire more assets
under management and to appease activists in their own shareholder base.
In addition, shareholder proposals are a prime area where this
opportunistic use of an adviser's voting power may be in play. Therefore,
mutual fund advisers must disclose the proceduresthey will use to identify
the link between support for a shareholder proposal at a particular company
and the enhancement of that company's shareholder value. This is necessary
to ensure that that advisers are complying with a primary objective of their
fiduciary duties, "adequatelymaximizing the value of their shares."8 2
Finally, consistent with these new disclosures and procedures, the
Commission should clarify that voting inconsistent with these new policies
and procedures or omission of such policies and procedures will be
considered a breach of the Proxy Voting Rule. I urge the SEC to be diligent
in enforcing all breaches of the Proxy Voting Rule. While enforcement most
clearly applies to the Big Three mutual fund advisers, it should also apply to
any investment adviser, large or small, that has delegated voting authority.

80. ARTHUR B. LABY, THE FIDUCIARY STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
REGULATION, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (JOHN D. MORLEY & WILLIAM

A. BIRDTHISTLE, EDS.) (FORTHCOMING ELGAR PUBLISHING), https://ssm.com/abstract=

2993429.
81. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20, supra note 22.
82. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note 13 (emphasis added).

